

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Last Name: [REDACTED] Gender: Male
First Name(s): [REDACTED] Father's Name: [REDACTED]
Other Names Used: Mother's Name: Ms. [REDACTED] (maiden name [REDACTED])
Children: [REDACTED] Place of Residence: [REDACTED]
Date of Birth/Age: [REDACTED] Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Ethnic Origin: Lango Religion: born Catholic; at current Pentecostal

Language(s) Spoken: Lango, Acholi, Kiswahili and English

Language(s) Written (if different from spoken): Lango, Acholi and English

Language(s) Used in Interview: English

Current Occupation: [REDACTED]

Former Occupation(s):

Place of Interview: [REDACTED], Kampala.

Date(s) of Interview: 8, 9 and 30 November 2004

Interviewer(s): [REDACTED] Interpreter(s): N/A

Names of all persons present during Interview: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED]

Signature(s):

[REDACTED]

WITNESS STATEMENT:**PROCEDURE:**

1. I was informed and explained what the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) are and what are their mandates, powers and authority.
2. I was informed on who the persons that were going to be present during the interview were and what was their position in the OTP and in the proceedings.
3. I was informed that this interview is voluntary, and therefore I declare that is from my free will that I'm present in this place and that I'm willingly given my statement.
4. I was informed that I might be called to testify before the Court and that, if called as a witness, my identity may have to be disclosed to the Court, the accused and to the defence counsel of the accused.
5. I was informed of the procedures available to the Court for ensuring the protection of confidential information provided to the Court, as well as for my own protection and security.
6. I was informed that it is possible that a copy of my statement may be transmitted by the Court to a State pursuant to a request made by that State under article 93 (10) (B) (i) (a) of the Rome Statute and the possible protective measures available in that case.
7. I was given the opportunity to ask what would be the procedures of the present interview. I was told that at the conclusion of the interview, I would be asked to sign a written statement after having had an opportunity to review it and add any corrections or additional information.

WITNESS PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND:

9. I have been in charge of many police investigations throughout my whole professional career. [REDACTED]

10. When I am in charge of the investigation, I decide on the structure of the reports. I usually follow the same standardized procedures in writing these reports. Normally, I include the following chapters: background (where all the information known before the [REDACTED])



beginning of the investigations is described); objectives; methodology; actions; findings; and recommendations. Sometimes, I also add a chapter on outstanding inquiries. This report structure is adjusted to the particular case I work on.

11. On the Police reports I wrote regarding the incidents in Barlonyo (ERN n. UGA.00018.003-UGA.00019.009), Pagak (ERN n. UGA.00023.421-UGA.00023.425) and Lukodi (ERN n. UGA.00023.022-UGA.00023.026.), I followed the usual structure of my reports. The only difference was in the report related to Barlonyo where I included a section on "scope", because there were allegations from the camp residents that there were burial sites outside of the camp, particularly the Abore Hole. Therefore, I wanted to make clear that the investigation had covered all those geographical areas.

UGANDA POLICE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION:

12. The Ugandan Police is organized in the following way: there is the Inspector General of the Police who responds directly to the Minister of Internal Affairs. He has a deputy and four other assistants. He has four assistants: the Assistant Inspector General Police in charge of CID (who is my superior); the Assistant Inspector General Police in charge of operations; the Assistant Inspector General Police in charge of administration and the Assistant Inspector General Police in charge of Special Branch (intelligence).

13. The country is divided into several police regions. The Regional Police Commanders are in charge of the regional offices and are the overall Police administrator. In all regions, there is also a Regional CID Officer who is in charge of all regional criminal investigations and is subordinated to the Regional Police Commander but also to the CID HQ. The CID HQ, located in Kampala, coordinates the activity of all the Regional CID officers and also conducts certain investigations.

14. The regional CID officers have the obligation of regularly reporting to CID HQ the criminal events and the investigations that are taking place in the region under their jurisdiction. That can be done by radio communications or by any other means of communication, such as fax, letter or telephone, depending on the urgency.

15. In case of a crime, an investigation is normally conducted by the local CID office in that region. In major investigations, however, the CID HQ might decide to take charge of investigations. That was what happened in the cases of Barlonyo, Pagak, and Lukodi.

16. Usually, the UPDF does not participate in the course of the criminal investigations. But, in the cases of Barlonyo, Pagak, and Lukodi, the UPDF provided security for the Police during those investigations. The Police might exchange information with the UPDF on a need-to-know basis, and vice versa. When the LRA is suspected to be the perpetrator of a criminal act, the UPDF might conduct its own investigation, with its own purposes, parallel to the Police investigation and information might be exchanged, as I said, on a need to know basis.

17. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports to the National Security Council. The National Security Council, through JIC, decided to form a JIC subcommittee dealing with the atrocities of the LRA and provide that evidence to the International Criminal Court.



The subcommittee was charged with the responsibility of going to the field, investigate, and compile reports of atrocities committed by LRA from July 2002 to date to help the ICC in their work. I was in charge of these investigations.

18. The information in the reports on the LRA atrocities provided to the ICC by the Ugandan authorities (ERN UGA.00010.006-UGA.00010.164 and UGA.000.00018.047-UGA.000.00018.150) was the result of the collection and unification of all the data available on the incidents they describe, which was obtained by the JIC subcommittee from the police, from the military intelligence and by Internal and External Security Organizations.

19. A copy of one of those reports was also given to me by one of the members of the JIC subcommittee for the fulfillment of my duties as an investigator. I forward a copy of one of these reports to the local CID officers, with instructions for them to try to get all the evidence possible on those incidents.

IDP CAMPS:

20. Since violence started in the north of Uganda in the late 1980s, people started to feel unsafe in their villages and so they started to move wherever there was a military detachment. This was the origin of the IDP camps. Later on, the Government realized that people would be safer living in those camps, protected by military detachments, and made it a policy to protect them. If a camp is very big, it is divided into several zones.

21. The Camp Leader is the person in charge of the registration of people living there and of the overall organization of the camp. The registration process for residents, however, might not always be very accurate. I am not sure how the Camp Leader of an IDP camp is selected, but I suppose that might be some democratic choice.

22. Some international organizations, as for instance the World Food Program, work in the IDP camps and might also have their own registers of the people living there.

23. A "trading center" is normally located along the roads and highways (near road junctions or bus stages) or in villages (near schools or market places). Basically, a trading center consists of some shops where people may buy things.

ABIYA ATTACK:

24. I'm aware of the attack on Abiya IDP camp on February 2004, although I was not involved in any police investigations regarding that event. The Police in Lira sent a situational report to CID HQ, as they always do, based on the information collected from the people, mainly survivors of the attack, who came to the local police station and reported the event, identifying some victims. I personally did not see that report, but I imagine that the report should be on the CID archives. The Regional Police in Lira should also be having a copy of this document.

UGA.00036.010



25. The main reason for not conduct any immediate investigation in Abiya just after the attack was due to the insecurity in the field at that time.

26. I do not know if the UPDF investigated the incident, but it is normal for them to investigate an incident like this, even more so because they had a detachment there and it was reported that some soldiers were killed.

27. I became familiar with the events on Abiya from some statements, recorded during Barlonyo's Police investigation, of people who were in Abiya during the attack. That happened with the statement of [REDACTED] (ERN UGA.00015.643-UGA.00015.644), taken on Lira Police station. There were also the statements of [REDACTED] (ERN UGA.00015.395-UGA.00015.408) and of [REDACTED] (ERN UGA.00015.718-UGA.00015.724), two boys who had been with the LRA and were reported to have participated in the Abiya attack and were in Rachele Rehabilitation Center.

28. Since the Police did not go to the crime scene immediately, no exhumations of corpses and post-mortem examinations were made regarding the victims of Abiya attack. I can not also give any information regarding the number and identification of dead victims. I also have no information regarding injured or abducted people, the nature and amount of damages suffered by the residents or any other consequences of that attack. I do not have any information on the place the bodies are currently buried and if those bodies were identified or not, and in affirmative how were they identified.

29. As far as I know, after the attack, no examination, photographs or video recordings of the crime scene, were made by the Police and no physical evidence was collected at Abiya IDP camp.

RECENT INVESTIGATIONS:

30. More recently, after knowing that the ICC was investigating specific incidents occurred in Northern Uganda, CID HQ gave instructions to local police to expedite the investigations on those incidents.

31. Therefore, the Police in Lira has been identifying and collecting statements from possible survivors of the Abiya attack on February 2004. I am aware that the CID Police Officer in Lira is also looking for the commanders and soldiers of AMUKA LDU militia detachment who were present at the time of the attack in Abiya.

32. In the beginning of the present interview, I was only aware that the local Police was preparing a file on this event, but I had not received any report on it yet. I had called the regional and district offices regarding Abiya investigation the week before the interview, and I was only given the information they had already collected some statements. During the present interview, however, I received a copy of the file on the ongoing Abiya investigation, organized by the local Police. In it can be found already some witnesses statements collected in October 2004. I handed over the copy of that file to the OTP investigators present in this interview on 11 November 2004, which is now identified by ERN UGA.00024.118-UGA.000.00024.282.



33. There was also not much Police investigation done on the attacks at Lwala Senior Secondary School, on June 2003, and the attack at Pajule IDP camp. The Regional CID office was directed by CID HQ to expedite the investigations, and I am personally supervising and coordinating their work.

34. CID HQ already received from the Regional Police the copy of a file on the attack to the Lwala School. On that file, already there are by now 13 witness statements taken. On 11 November 2004, I handed over a copy of that file to the OTP investigators who were conducting the present interview, which is now identified by ERN UGA.00024.014-UGA.00024.107.

35. For the investigations that are now being conducted by the Regional Police units, the CID HQ provided the CID Regional Officers who are conducting the investigations two documents to help them in identifying the main topics that should be covered on those investigations. Those documents are being used as guidelines in questioning witnesses in the ongoing investigations. We have received them from the Solicitor General, I do not remember when, and they relate to Barlonyo attack, but we covered the word "Barlonyo" and told our officers to use that document as a template for all the incidents in investigation as a checklist. I handed over a copy of those documents during the present interview, on 11 November 2004, now identified as ERN UGA.00024.002-UGA.00024.006.

BARLONYO:

Decision, planning and methodology of police investigation

Investigation Report

36. I wrote the report "*Preliminary report into investigations of the murders of residents of Cuk Adek Internally Displaced People's Camp, Barlonyo Village, Ogur Sub-County, Erute North County, Lira District (Lira CRB/202/04)*", dated 9 March 2004. A copy of this report, with the ERN UGA.00018.003 to UGA00018.009, was shown to me by the investigators of the OTP during the present interview.

37. The "Background" section (Chapter 1) of my report is based on the information that I received before conducting the field investigation. The "Findings" (Chapter n. 5) is completely based on the evidence obtained during the field investigation. The main sources of evidence for the conclusions of the Police report are the witness statements, the physical evidence collected at the site, the forensic report and the death certificates from Lira Hospital.

38. Although the Police report is called a "preliminary report" there was no other follow up reports after this one, so those are at the present moment the findings of the Ugandan Police in regard to the Barlonyo attack.

UGA.00036.012



39. I believe that the document identified by ERN UGA.00015.158 to ERN UGA.00015.163 is a draft of my official Preliminary Police Report on Barlonyo attack, identified by ERN UGA.00018.003 to ERN UGA.00018.009.

40. Usually, the police report is presented to the Prosecutor for the legal criminal proceedings that follows. But in the present case, due to the intervention of ICC, a copy of the report was delivered to the OTP and not yet to local judicial authorities.

Beginning of investigation

41. Regarding the attacks on Barlonyo, Pagak and Lukodi the Uganda Government was aware that the ICC was interested in the investigation of those attacks and some measures were taken to conduct a Police investigation and to try to collect as much evidence on those incidents as possible. It was decided that with the Army (UPDF) providing military escort the Police would go to those crime scenes and would perform a criminal investigation.

42. The decision to expedite an investigation on the Barlonyo attack was taken, shortly after the attack, by the JIC, following the policy to investigate all the LRA atrocities.

43. Barlonyo attack was first reported to the CID HQ by the Lira local Police. On the document named "Diary of Investigations" (ERN UGA.00015.144-UGA.00015.155), there's a register, dated from 24-02-2004, made by an Officer from the local Police, mentioning that, on that day, the communication of Barlonyo attack was drafted and sent to the relevant offices. In fact, he had the obligation to report the incident within 24 hours to the Director of CID and other relevant offices. The document identified by ERN UGA.00015.157 (R1) is a copy of that communication made by the Lira Police to CID HQ regarding Barlonyo incident.

44. That "Diary of Investigations" refers to the Lira Police Station diary of events. The registers that are dated 24-02-2004 were made by the local Police, particularly by officers [REDACTED]. I recognize the signatures of those policemen on the documents shown to me. From that date on, I was the person that drafted and signed all the entries in that Diary.

45. The Barlonyo attack was investigated under the reference number CRB/202/04.

Investigation team

46. A mixed team with a total of 43 Police officers, comprising members of the internal and external security organizations, military and police (CID), was created to investigate the Barlonyo attack. The team included people from CID HQ, Regional and District Police. The team created, comprising of all these people, was the one that physically went out to the field and performed the investigation.

47. I was selected to be the person responsible for the coordination of efforts of the investigation team. I believe that one of the reasons I was chosen was the fact that I am of

UGA.00036.013



Lango ethnic origin and I could communicate in the language of the people from that region.

48. I was on leave, when I was informed that I would be part of the investigation team. I left Kampala on 25 February and traveled to Gulu, where I arrived on the same day. From Gulu I traveled to Lira, where I arrived on the 26 February and I met the rest of the team. The day before, a big demonstration regarding the events in Barlonyo had happened in Lira, so it was not advisable to go to Lira on that day but only on the 26 February.

49. On 26 February, there was a meeting of the joint team in Lira, in which it was decided to do radio broadcastings, asking all the people who had lost relatives in the sequence of Barlonyo attack to report to the Police. Those who were in Lira, were asked to report at the Lira Police Station. Those who were in the IDP camp or in the surrounding area were asked to report at Ogur Health Centre.

50. I drafted the documents named "Investigation plan" and "Operation order" (ERN UGA.00015.164 to UGA.00015.169), when I was already in Lira. Those documents are signed by me.

51. I also drafted the document identified by ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172, which lists the names of the people that were involved in the investigation of Barlonyo attack. Some of the original team members who failed to attend for one or another reason were replaced by other police officers, although the changes do not appear on the original list.

52. During the investigation I was the Senior Investigating Officer, and I was deputized by Mr. [REDACTED] (Deputy Senior Investigations Officer), and by Mr. [REDACTED] (from CID HQ), who was in charge of the operations on the crime scene and reported to me what was happening there).

53. As 132 people reported to us after the announcement at the radio, we decided to divide ourselves into groups. A team of 6 officers stayed in Lira Police Station and collected the statements of those who appeared there. That group (identified as group 5 on document with ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172), was all comprised with local police officers from Lira Police Station. The officers identified in the group 3, called "Interview Room", stayed in Lira, also collecting statements of those who appeared there after the radio broadcastings.

54. Another team went to the crime scene and collected the statements of those people who appeared there and who were at Ogur Health Centre. That team (identified as group 6, on document with ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172) was comprised of 10 persons and was led by Mr. [REDACTED] (6.a), an officer from the Central Police Station in Kampala. The other officers were all from Lira Police Station. Mr. [REDACTED] died in the car accident that took place on 1 March, at around 20.00 hours, when part of the team was returning to Kampala.

55. Apart from the officers who took the statements, there was also a person, Mr. [REDACTED] described as the statement reader (identified as group 4, on document with ERN

n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172), whose function was to screen the statements, take notes of anything that was of interest and transmit that information to the other members of the joint team.

56. The Inquiry Team (identified as group 7, on document with ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172), was comprised of 5 officers: Mr. [REDACTED] (7.a) was from CID HQ, Lt. [REDACTED] were from ISO and ESO. The two other members were from the local Police. This team had the task of following from Lira Police Station the leads that were appearing from the recorded statements. The inquiry team and I were the officers who went to Rachele Rehabilitation Centre and performed the interviews of [REDACTED].

57. The group of 4 officers identified as "Counter" (in group 8 on document with ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172) are officers of Lira Police Station who were assigned exclusively with work related on Barlonyo, in order not to disturb the regular Police work in Lira Police Station. The officer identified in group 9, on document with ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172, was a local policeman and had the task of deploying the other members of the several teams according to the necessities.

58. Finally there was the group named "Scene" (identified as group 10, on document with ERN n. UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172), comprised of 10 officers, plus the 3 mortuary attendants (identified in group 11 of the same document). This team had the mission to go to Barlonyo crime scene and make all the relevant investigations that needed to be done there.

59. This group was led by Mr. [REDACTED] and was also comprised of the following officers: DISO Lira; the three doctors from the forensic team (Dr. Kalyemenya Martin, Dr. Kibuka Musoke and Dr. Byaruhanga Moses); [REDACTED], from ISO; a person from the District Special Branch Officer Lira (referenced as number 10.g), whose name I don't remember); Ms. [REDACTED] (10.h), the Government Analyst, who works in the Central Police Laboratory in Kampala; Mr. [REDACTED], the Scenes of Crime Officer (SOCO), whose main objective was to collect all evidence at the crime scene; and Mr. [REDACTED] the Public Relations Officer (PRO), who assisted the SOCO officer.

60. The team went to Barlonyo camp for the first time only on the 27th February 2004 and not earlier because the arrangements regarding security had to be provided first by the army. I personally stayed only on the 27th February at Barlonyo crime scene. I came back the first day to the headquarters of the team in Lira to report to Kampala and on the 28th I stayed in Lira Police Station doing the coordinating work.

61. The Police investigation teams 6 and 10, including the forensic team, stayed in Barlonyo on the 27th and the 28th, supervised by Mr. [REDACTED]. On 28 February 2004, those teams also visited other surrounding areas of the camp, including the Abore Hole, to look for some graves that were outside the camp, and went to Ogur Health Centre (where survivors of the incident were relocated) to collect their statements.

UGA.00036.015



62. The 5th Division Tactical HQ was visited on 28 February 2004 to request permission to interview the returned LRA soldiers ([REDACTED]) in Rachele Rehabilitation Center. The military were the ones who took the boys there, and that was why we got the instructions to go there first. On 28 and 29 February 2004, some members of the investigation team, including me, went to Rachele Rehabilitation Centre to record the statements of these returned LRA soldiers.

63. On 29 February 2004, no teams returned to Barlonyo IDP camp. On that day, the forensic team still examined the three bodies that were found in the surrounding villages near Ogur Health Center, and afterwards, together with some members of the investigation team, returned to Kampala.

64. On 1 March, some officers of the investigation team went to Lira Hospital. There they saw, photographed and video-recorded the injured people that were admitted there after the attack. They also interviewed the survivors who were found there and the superintendent of the Hospital. Finally, they collected all the documentation available, including the lists of injured people that were attended in the Hospital after the attack.

65. The death certificates from the persons who died at Lira Hospital were brought to me by the District CID officer in Lira, Mr. [REDACTED]

Barlonyo IDP camp

66. The distance between Barlonyo IDP camp and Lira village is almost 30 km. In between the two places only exists Ogur Health Center, located at about 7 or 8 km from Barlonyo. After the attack, most of the people that lived in Barlonyo ran for shelter in Ogur Health Center and remained there. Barlonyo IDP camp was abandoned after the attack.

67. On 27 February, the investigation team crossed Ogur Health Center, while going to the camp, and made an oral announcement to people saying there that the survivors who lost relatives during the attack should go with the team back to Barlonyo IDP camp. The other survivors in Ogur should wait there until the investigators would have time to take their statements. Some survivors were then verbally identified and went with the team to the camp, although we did not take their particulars at the time.

68. Between Ogur and Barlonyo, we did not see a single person.

69. Local politicians followed the investigation team to the crime site from Lira. Those politicians were the Member of Parliament (MP) for Erute North, Mr. Charles Angiro and the MP for Lira Municipality, Ms. Cecilia Ogwal. Once in Barlonyo IDP camp, they asked the Police officers what preparations they had made to bury the bodies and we replied that our most important exercise was to determine their cause of death. They first objected to us exhuming the dead bodies, but then they realized the necessity of doing it and gave their agreement.



70. On the 28th February, also the Speaker of the National Assembly, Sir Edward Ssekandi, went to Barlonyo IDP camp to offer his condolences. He was accompanied by Ms. Cecilia Ogwal and Mr. Omara Atubo, the MP for Otuke County.

71. When in para 1.2 of the Preliminary Police Report into the investigation at Barlonyo's attack (ERN UGA.00018.0003-UGA.00018.0009) I mentioned "local leaders" I am referring to the Camp Leader and to the MP's who were present at the crime scene.

72. While the investigation team was in Barlonyo site, no observers from other organizations (NGO's, Red Cross, Rehabilitation Centres, Church Organizations, others) or journalists from newspapers or other media were present in the camp. Some reporters wanted to accompany the investigation team, but they were not allowed to do so.

73. The number of huts and of people living in the camp mentioned in paragraph 1.1 of the Preliminary Police Report into the investigation at Barlonyo's attack (ERN UGA.00018.0003-UGA.00018.0009) was provided verbally by the Camp Leader of Barlonyo IDP camp and by the local politicians who were at the crime scene. I do not remember if Police asked the Camp Leader for or was given any registration of the people who lived in Barlonyo IDP camp.

74. According to the witnesses' statements including the statements of the Camp Leader and some of the AMUKA soldiers, Barlonyo camp was guarded by around 60 Amuka soldiers. There were no UPDF soldiers in the camp, not even to command the detachment. The Police was not given any registers of the names of the AMUKA LDU militia members that were deployed at Barlonyo. I do not know if those registers even exist, and only the army can provide that kind of information.

75. The army would be in a better position to explain exactly how AMUKA LDU militia soldiers are recruited and trained. The only thing I can say is that they are volunteer people recruited locally and that their training is not as complete as the army's training. These people are under the Ministry of Defense and are paid by them. The Government provides the weapons and ammunitions to the AMUKA LDU militia.

76. The activity of the AMUKA LDU militia is supervised by the UPDF. In Lira, there is an UPDF officer specifically in charge of the AMUKA issues – [REDACTED] But I do not know how that supervision works and if there was regular communication between AMUKA militia and UPDF soldiers.

77. During the investigation, no statement was taken from the AMUKA LDU militia Commander in Barlonyo, because he was not around at the time the investigation team was at the site.

78. The AMUKA LDU militia military detachment was placed on the eastern side, apart from the rest of the camp at a distance that I can not state precisely. There was, though, a clear space between the military and civilian parts of the camp. AMUKA soldiers lived inside the military area of the camp. It is possible, though, that some family members of the AMUKA soldiers might have lived in the civilian parts of the camp.

UGA.00036.017



79. I am not very knowledgeable about military uniforms, but I know that AMUKA LDU militia was normally provided by the Government with a plain green uniform. UPDF soldiers have several uniforms, some in plain green and others in camouflage. I have never seen an LRA soldier, so I really do not know their uniforms.

80. People in the north of Uganda should be familiar with UPDF and AMUKA uniforms, because they are used to the presence of those soldiers.

81. From my experience as an investigator, I can state that part of the *modus operandi* of the LRA is the use of military uniforms similar to those of the defense forces protecting the places to be attacked, such as AMUKA or UPDF uniforms. Their purpose is to be confused by civilians with government soldiers. That happened in various occasions, as for instances in Abiya and Barlonyo attacks, according to several witness statements I read. I know this also because I talk to people back in my home area, in Lango region, and people told me that LRA soldiers look similar to UPDF and sometimes are very hard to distinguish.

82. I stayed in Lira until the 2 March and resumed duties in CID HQ on 3 March.

Crime scene examination

83. I confirm that the investigation covered all the areas mentioned in the Chapter 4 "Scope", of the Preliminary Police Report into the investigation at Barlonyo's attack (ERN UGA.00018.0003-UGA.00018.0009).

84. The sketch plan of Barlonyo scene of murder (ERN UGA.00018.026) was made by Mr. [REDACTED] and I agree that the outline of the sketch is accurate.

85. The investigation team went throughout Barlonyo site to inspect for evidence, making a general surveillance of the crime scene. No metal detector or similar technical means were used in that inspection. The investigation team while walking through Barlonyo IDP camp collected some cartridges, bullets, ammunitions and other physical items. Those items are the ones described in the document called "exhibit record" (ERN UGA.0015.200). I have no recollection that any additional items were collected.

86. These items were received and checked by officers [REDACTED], who signed the exhibits record on 28-04-2004. After, those items were handed over to Mr. [REDACTED] and, finally, were given to Ms. [REDACTED] who took them back to the Police Laboratory for examinations. There was made no record of the exact location in the camp where the items mentioned on the exhibit were found. I never received any expert report regarding those items and I can not say if any expert examination was performed upon those objects. The items collected at Barlonyo camp are still in the Police Laboratory.

87. During the present interview I got in contact with Ms. [REDACTED] to try to confirm if the physical items collected in Barlonyo crime scene were still with her. Then she clarified me that those items were brought back to Kampala in the vehicle that had the accident in Luwero. Those items were first collected by the Luwero Police who later handed them over to Mr. [REDACTED] who gave them to Ms. [REDACTED]. The Police did not

crosscheck yet if all the items described in the exhibit record were recovered after the automobile accident.

88. Traces of bullet impacts on the walls of huts or on the surroundings (trees and ground) that might have been found during the site inspection were not recorded. The soil under the bodies was not examined in a systematic way and the eventual findings were not register. No samples were collected from any parts of the camp (huts, ashes, etc), the graves and the bodies for posterior analyses.

Photographs and Video-recordings

89. The photographs, shown to me during the present interview and identified by the ERN ns. UGA.00011.170 to UGA.00011.491, were taken during the Police investigation, on 27 and 28 February 2004, by Mr. [REDACTED], the SOCO agent. In general, these pictures show images of various parts of Barlonyo IDP camp, including burned houses, and of victim's corpses and remains.

90. The photos identified by ERN numbers UGA.00011.004-UGA.00011.072, were taken on 1 March 2003 at Lira Hospital by the same person, when the investigation team visited the place. Those photos show images of injured victims attended at Lira Hospital after Barlonyo attack.

91. The labels put on the photograph album were made by Mr. [REDACTED], the person who took the photographs.

92. I was not present when some of the photos taken, particularly those that were taken on the 28th at Barlonyo IDP camp and on 1 March at Lira Hospital, but I have no doubts that these were the pictures taken by Mr. [REDACTED] during Police investigation. There might be other photographs that were not given to OTP, but only the photographer, Mr. [REDACTED] the SOCO agent, would be able to clarify that.

93. The main aim on taking those photographs was to preserve the images of the crime scene as much as possible and to take photos of all victims found at the crime scene, particularly of the identified dead bodies. According to the adopted proceeding, whenever a grave was located (especially if a corpse was identified), a member of the team wrote the name of the death person on a card (or mentioned that the body was not identify), put the card next to the victim and then a photograph was taken. I am not sure if pictures of all bodies and graves were taken. Once again, only the photographer will be able to respond to that question.

94. I recognize Barlonyo IDP camp on pictures identified by ERN UGA.00011.006, UGA.00011.0170, UGA.00011.0172, UGA.00011.0174, UGA.00011.0176, UGA.00011.0178, UGA.00011.0179, UGA.00011.0180 and UGA.00011.0182. Those photos show general views of the camp and of some of the burned huts. Regarding photo UGA.00011.004, I am not sure if it is Barlonyo IDP camp or not.


95. On pictures identified by ERN ns. UGA.00011.203, UGA.00011.204, UGA.00011217, UGA.00011221, UGA.00011228, UGA.00011238, UGA.00011271,

UGA.00036.019



UGA.00011272, UGA.00011290, UGA.00011391, UGA.00011421, UGA.00011450 and UGA.00011472, I can identify people dressed with the costumes used during exhumation by the forensic team and the mortuary attendants, although I can not tell the names of any of the people shown in those photos, as their faces are not visible. Picture UGA.00011.204 shows some local people helping in the exhumation of a body in a grave.

96. The investigation team also video-recorded Barlonyo crime scene and the wounded people in Lira Hospital. The results of those recordings are the videos named "Barlonyo Camp Burials" and "Victims of Barlonyo in Lira Hospital", identified as ERN UGA.00021.012 and UGA.00021.006.

97. The person in charge of doing those recordings was Mr.  (the PRO agent). The main aim was, as with the photos, to preserve the images of the camp after the attack and mainly to obtain images of the bodies that were found in the camp and their possible identification, although the recording did not cover all the bodies that were found. On the filming at Lira Hospital the purpose was to film the injured people that were attended there.

98. The video identified as ERN UGA.00021.012, shows images of the investigation team working in the crime scene and the burial of the victims in the trenches. On that video it is possible to recognize several of the people that comprise the investigation team, including me, and several of the politicians that went to Barlonyo crime scene, such as Hn. Cecilia Ogwal (at 1m, 22s and 1h 32m, 10s), Hn. Charles Angiro (at 37m), and the Hon. Edward Ssekandi.

99. The military forces were also making their own video recording of Barlonyo crime scene for their own purposes. The person that took that video appears in the video made by the Police, identified by the ERN UGA 00021.012, at 01h, 04m, 39s.

Witnesses Interviews

100. During the investigation the different teams, already identified, collected the statements of those that have lost relatives during the attack and were at the crime scene or reported to the Police as explained above. The copies of those statements are the documents identified by ERN UGA.000 15.353 to UGA.00015.772, that were shown to me during the present interview.

101. On Binder "A" (ERN UGA.000 15.353-UGA.00015.640) are the statements collected in Barlonyo crime scene and Ogur Health Centre, on 27 and 28 February 2004. On Binder B - CPS Lira (ERN ns. UGA.000 15.641-UGA.00015.715) are the statements taken at Lira Police Station, from 27 to 29 February. On Binder C (ERN ns. UGA.00015.716-UGA.00015.733) are the statements collected at Rachele Rehabilitation Center on 28-02-2004. Finally, on Binder D are the statements collected in Lira Hospital (ERN ns. UGA.000 15.734-UGA.00015.772).



102. I want to clarify that the statement of [REDACTED], identified by the ERN. UGA00015.395 to UGA.00015.408 is misplaced. That statement was taken at Rachele Rehabilitation Center, so it should be filled on Binder D and not A.

103. Those witnesses' statements were recorded by the statement recorders mentioned on document identified by ERN UGA.00015.170 to UGA.00015.172. Some of them though might have joined the team only on the 28th, as replacements for other people. For instance, [REDACTED], was not on the original team and was also one of the interviewers.

104. There were verbal instructions given, by me and by my deputies, to those that were doing the interviews as to the kind of questions that should be done and the topics that should be covered. The notes of the statements were being taken while the statements were recorded. Most people who recorded the statement knew both Luo (Acholi or Lango) and English languages (that was one of the criteria in the selection of the police agents for the joint team), so the people who recorded the statements translated them right away into English and was sign in that language.

105. All the interviews to residents or victims were recorded in written statements. I am not sure if a statement of the AMUKA commander has been recorded in the meantime, but Lira Police would have informed me about this.

106. The army told us about the existence five persons in Rachele Rehabilitation Centre that could give information on the attackers of Barlonyo IDP camp. We followed that lead and they brought to us five boys: [REDACTED] and a boy aged 6 years old, whose mother had been killed during the attack. We did not take the statement of this boy, considering his young age and the fact that he was not talking coherently, but we recorded the statements of the other four. As far as I remember one of them participated in the attack on Barlonyo and the other two had been soldiers in the LRA and had participated in Abiya attack.

107. I was present in those interviews together with Mr. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. For each child, there would be also an introduction made by one of the workers in the Rehabilitation Center, giving an introduction about the history of each of the children.

108. Those interviews were video recorded and the result was the video now identified by the ERN UGA 0021.008. The people that appear in that video are [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. For each child there would be an introduction made by one of the Rachele Rehabilitation Centre workers. This video was made by the PRO agent, Mr. [REDACTED] who recorded these interviews conducted on 28 and 29 February 2004 in Rachele Rehabilitation Center in Lira. The interviews that are video recorded were conducted in the Luo (Acholi and Lango) language.

109. When the interview with the woman that appears in the video identified as UGA.00021.008 was recorded, I was not present. I believe that interview was made

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UGA.00036.021
[Barcode]

because she was an LRA returnee. But as her interview was not relevant to Barlonyo, it was not transformed into a statement.

Killed Victims

110. When the investigation team, including myself, arrived at Barlonyo camp, found a terrible scenery. The camp was completely abandoned by the population since the attack.

111. Dead bodies, already in an advanced state of decomposition, were scattered throughout the camp, some of them still unburied. Some dogs were eating the abandoned corpses. Several victims were buried in very shallow graves and in some cases you could see a hand, an arm or a leg appearing from the ground. It was difficult to tell what kind of injuries the corpses had, because of the advanced decomposition state.

112. From my perception, all the bodies that were found were from civilians, since they were still dressed in civilian clothes. I do not remember seeing any corpse in a military uniform. There were bodies of men, women and children amongst the victims

Identification of graves and bodies

113. To locate the graves and identify the bodies, the members of the investigation team, including the pathologists, used the following methodology: first, was made the already mentioned announcement to try to locate survivors who had lost relatives during the attack. Then, those persons, if present in the site, showed to one of the people from the investigation team the place of the grave and, even before the body was exhumed, gave the particulars of the dead person, providing the name, sex, and age of the victim. After the body was exhumed the relative would make a second identification of the corpse.

114. The identification data received from the relatives would be put in a tag and the body would be photographed.

Exhumations and Post-mortem examination

115. The corpses were exhumed sometimes with the help of the relatives, and after examined by the forensic doctor. The three doctors divided the camp in three zones and each one was responsible for one of them. After the medical examination, each body was placed inside a black plastic bag (a "body bag") and reburied.



116. It is very possible that the investigation team failed to identify some grave sites, due to the fact that only the visible graves and those that were located and identified by relatives were discovered. So, it is possible that other graves exist, but are not visible and were not located by anyone. The lack of time to perform the investigation also contributed to the difficulty in finding more victims. The same with the identification of the bodies. Police was only able to identify the bodies that were pointed out by relatives, who gave the details relative to those people. In the end, Police were only able to identify the graves and bodies that were shown by the relatives, but there could very well have been other relatives and bodies who we did not discover.



117. For those reasons, I consider very likely that the number of people killed in Barlonyo IDP camp as a sequence to the attack mentioned in the Police report and in the Forensic report upon Barlonyo might not express the real number of victims presented. The real number is likely to be higher.

118. There were three bodies buried in the surroundings of the camp, but I was not present in the search and finding of these bodies. I know, however, from the other officers involved in the investigation that no dead bodies were found in the Abore hole.

119. I wasn't present when the 12 bodies were found in a trench, as is said in the forensic report (ERN UGA.00018.011-UGA.00018.011). So, I can not say if photographs of those bodies were taken and where those graves were located in the camp. I believe that what might have happened was that, during the night or the morning after the attack, the army went to the camp to check what had happened and might have moved the bodies, putting those bodies in the trench so that they could easily be recovered.

120. We did not find any bodies of dead AMUKA soldiers. Some people talked of two AMUKA dead, others of six, but we have been unable to confirm the exact numbers from the army. The first ones to arrive at Barlonyo ICP camp, on the night after the attack, were the UPDF soldiers and the army might have taken the bodies of the military people. I think that the 5th Division Commander,  and  (in charge of AMUKA militia in Lira), did go to the camp after the attack. I do not know if an autopsy was performed upon those bodies.

121. The photo identified as UGA.000.00011.244, taken during Police investigation, which was shown to me by the OTP investigators, was taken in the crime scene of Barlonyo attack and shows the reference to the body of an "Otima Alex (AMUKA guard short)", with the legend "body not found at the scene". On my view, this location of the body was identified by some person that was present in the camp and might be one of the situations in which the army moved the body of that AMUKA soldier from the site.

122. I was shown by ICC investigators some photographs that show undetermined remains identified in the tags on those photographs as belonging to Awany Alfred (ERN n. UGA.00011.186), Omara Tom (ERN n. UGA.00011.220), Ogwawi Ray (ERN n. UGA.00011.223), Akello Eceri (ERN n. UGA.00011.230), Akello Mary (ERN n. UGA.00011.232), Okot Geoffrey (ERN n. UGA.00011.315_07), Angwer Santo (ERN n. UGA.00011.315_3), Albartina Odur (ERN n. UGA.00011.333 and UGA.00011.335), Acen Rose (ERN n. UGA.00011.361), Ocen Augustine (ERN n. UGA.00011.371), Ogwang Francis (ERN n. UGA.00011.397), Aceng Madalena (ERN n. UGA.00011.425), Akullu Anna (ERN n. UGA.00011.447) and Obua, son of Akullu Anna (ERN n. UGA.00011.449). I explained that those undetermined remains must have been identified as belonging to a certain person by relatives, according with the established proceeding.

123. The formal decision from Lira magistrate allowing the performance of the exhumations and the post-mortem examination to the bodies is the document identified as UGA.00015.201 (R18). The document identified as UGA.00015.202 (R-19) is the affidavit that Police presented to the magistrate. The document identified as ERN

UGA.00015.203 (R-20) is my letter to the pathologist to fill in some forms for post-mortem examination. The documents identified as UGA.00015.204 to UGA.00015.326 (R-21 to R-145) are the Police Forms 48 (mentioned in document ERN n. UGA.00015.203), through which Police formally requested the Doctors the performance of the post-mortem examination. One of these forms was filled for each one of the victims. Together with this document the Police sent the Police Forms 48-C (also mentioned in document ERN n. UGA.00015.203), in which the Doctors should put the post-mortem report, filling one for each victim. These last forms were given to the Doctors in duplicate for them to record the conclusions of the medical examinations. However, the Doctors should still have the duplicates of those documents with them, as none was delivered to the Police. I do not know if the Doctors have already filled the 48-C Police Forms.

124. From my perception, the main causes of the death of the people in Barlonyo camp appeared to be the burning, the cutting, the shooting and the smashed skulls with clubs. I base my conclusions on my perception of the crime scene, on the account of the events given by the witnesses, on the death certificates of the victims that died in Lira Hospital and on the conclusions of the forensic report (although I thought this one was not very conclusive on this topic).

Inhumation of corpses

125. Some of the dead victims were first buried by their relatives. But, after the exhumations, it was decided that the bodies should be reburied collectively in the trenches that had been dug beforehand at the military detachment. So, after the post-mortem examination, the bodies were all put in the "body bags" and carried into the trenches, where they were reburied in a collective grave.

126. I am not sure if the bodies that were reburied collectively in the trench after the exhumations were properly identified with a tag with the particulars of each one of the victims (even regarding those people that had been identified by relatives during the exhumation process), since I was not present at the site by that time.

127. Two to three weeks later, a large wall was built as a memory to the victims of Barlonyo attack over the collective grave, in a formal ceremony held by the Government. I suppose that, from the 124 corpses exhumed, the 121 exhumed from Barlonyo IDP camp are still buried there. The three bodies found buried outside of the camp remained buried in their original location.

128. The lists of names of victims admitted in Lira Hospital and the list of names of deceased people that are reported in the document "Diary of Investigations" (ERN UGA.00015.143-UGA.00015.143) as being documents "per R1-R2" and "per R3" are the some of the same lists that were later identified as documents "R7" and "R7a" (ERN UGA.00015.186-UGA.00015.189), "R8" (UGA.00015.190-UGA.00015.191), "R13" (UGA.00015.196), "R14" (UGA.00015.197) and "R15" (UGA.00015.198). The original numbers were given by Lira Local Police in the local file, but after those lists were given to CID HQ's and introduced in the CID file, they were renumbered. All these lists were



received by CID from Lira Local Police, but I do not know how and from whom those lists and the data in them were collected by the local police force.

129. The document identified as UGA.00015.173 to UGA.00015.185 (“R6-R6-K”), is a record of names of the victims of Barlonyo attack, which were assumed to have been killed and was provided to the Police by the Camp Leader.

130. The document identified as UGA.00015.186 to UGA.00015.189 (“R7”), regards the victims of Barlonyo attack that were attended at Female Ward in Lira Hospital and was provided by local police.

131. The document identified as UGA.00015.190 to UGA.00015.191 (“R8 and R8a”), records the Victims Admitted at Lira Hospital. This document was received by the local police from Lira Hospital. This is the official list of victims that attended Lira Hospital in the sequence of the attack.

132. The List of names of Deceased Persons, identified as UGA.00015.196 (R13), has as source the Local Police. I assume that the information in that list came through information of relatives.

133. The list of victims admitted to Adyebo Ward in Lira Hospital, identified as UGA.00015.197 (“R14”), was received from a local policeman that went to Lira hospital. The list of Victims Admitted to Ward 3 (“R15”), identified as UGA.00015.198, and the list of victims and other data identified as UGA.00015.199 (“R16”), were also obtained from a local Policeman.

134. The lists received from the local police were supposed to be used during the investigation in the identification of the dead and injured victims. But, as after we made our own exhumations and we visit Lira Hospital we end up not using those documents.

135. The maps, identified as UGA.00015.192 (“R9”), UGA.00015.193 (“R10”), UGA.00015.194 (“R11”) and UGA.00015.195 (“R12”), were used during the investigations to help the different members of the team in several matters.

136. The medical certificates of death of the people that died in Lira Hospital (ERN n. UGA.00015.774-UGA.000.00015.787) were brought to me by [REDACTED], the District CID officer in Lira, who received them from Lira Hospital Superintendent. To my knowledge, when I wrote the “Brief facts of the case” (ERN UGA.00015.346) it existed 15 certificates of death at Lira Hospital in the Police file and that was the reason why I noted in that document that 15 people had died in that Hospital. Going back to my file, during the present interview, I confirmed that there were 15 death certificates on it, but that two of those death certificates were regarding Mr. Obwor Wilberto and had the exact same data (name, age, wounds and cause of death), so I believe that one of these certificates is repeated on my file and that someone, whose identity I do not know, took it off while copying it. I made a handwritten list of the 15 names on the death certificates that are on the Police file, with the repeated name and I handed that list over to the investigators who are conducting the present interview, which is now identified as UGA.000.00024.117.



Injured People

137. We did not provide any transportation to the injured people, because we arrived too late. I would think that the local government and the army would have helped the victims, given that the hospital is at around 35 kilometers from the incident site.

138. As I said before, only on 1 March 2004, the investigation team visited Lira Hospital and photographed and video recorded the injured victims.

Destruction of Property and Looting

139. From my perception of Barlonyo IDP camp, the signs of destruction covered all the camp. All the huts, covering the entire extension of the camp, were burned. Some huts were even still smoldering. Some of the roofs of the houses had collapsed completely and some of the walls had fallen. Later we found that, in some cases, the relatives used the walls of the burned houses to cover the bodies of their relatives who died burned inside them. There were also several objects, such as food, utensils and other personal objects scattered around the camp.

140. The burned huts in Barlonyo were physically counted by the investigative team, and the numbers are the ones mentioned in the Preliminary Police Report into the investigation at Barlonyo's attack (ERN UGA.00018.0003-UGA.00018.0009), para. 5.16: 332 burned houses of the camp and 59 burned houses of the military detachment.

141. There might have been more burned huts than those that were counted, because the number achieved by Police investigators does not match with the higher number given verbally to the Police by the Camp Leader. I think it is possible that the members of the investigation team might have missed some destroyed hut that would go unnoticed.

142. According to the witnesses statements, looting took place during the attack as usually happens during LRA attacks, but no additional information was collected during the Police investigation.


Abductions

143. According to some witness's statements, during the attack, some people were abducted to carry the loot, although it was not possible to establish their number and identities. I have no knowledge if any of these people has returned since the time I wrote my report, but I believed that if some of those people returned the local police office in Lira recorded that fact and can provide additional information.

Sexual Crimes

144. There was no evidence collected during the Police investigation that sexual assaults or abuses were committed during the attack at Barlonyo IDP camp. I do not think it is LRA practice to rape women during attacks. Women are usually first abducted and then presented to the commanders.

UGA.00036.026



145. After being shown the photographs identified by ERN n. UGA.00011.245 and UGA.00011.247 (regarding [REDACTED]), UGA.00011.296 (regarding [REDACTED]), UGA.00011.411 and UGA.00011.415 (regarding [REDACTED]), and asked if I thought those women cloths being taken off from their waist down could be a sign of sexual assault, I answer that I do not think these people were sexually molested. The state of their clothes could have happened, because the burial process that was done in a hurry.

Police investigation's conclusions regarding Barlonyo attack

146. The conclusion of the Police investigation that the attack started at around 17.00 hours of the 21st February 2004 (see para. 5.1, of Police report - ERN UGA.00018.003 to UGA00018.009) was based on the witnesses' interviews and on the information received by Lira Police.

147. The conclusion that attackers entered the camp for the eastern side and, after the attack, retreated in the same direction (see paras. 5.1 and 5.8 of report), were based on the description of the attack made by the witnesses that were interviewed.

148. Regarding the kind of weapons used by attackers, the conclusions of the Police were mainly based in the witnesses' statements. Although some physical items were collected from Barlonyo crime scene, I was not given any ballistic or any other kind of expert report based on those items. People said that the attackers were armed with clubs, machetes and big guns, without specifying what kind of guns.

Uniforms of attackers

149. The conclusion in the preliminary report that some of the attackers were dressed in military uniforms similar to those worn by the UPDF/AMUKA militia was based also in the witnesses statements collected during the investigation.

Language of attackers

150. The only evidence collected regarding the language (or languages) spoken by the attackers was from the witnesses' statements who said the attackers were speaking Luo with an Acholi accent.

151. Asked about the main languages spoken by the people living in Barlonyo IDP camp (Lira District), I clarified that Lango is the main language spoken by the people in the camp. Both Lango and Acholi are Luo languages, as well as Alur, Jo-Phadole and Ja-Luo are Luo languages. But, the languages most close to each other are the Lango and the Acholi languages. In fact, Lango and Acholi are the same languages, only with a different accent and particular expressions. A person that speaks Lango or Acholi can easily understand a person that speaks Acholi or Lango, but at the same time, will know that that person is an Acholi or a Lango (because of the different accent and the particular expressions used).

Description of attack:

UGA.00036.027
[REDACTED]

152. The conclusions that on the beginning of attack, confusion emerged because the AMUKA militia was calling out for residents to leave their huts and make for the bush, whilst attackers were calling out for them to remain in their huts was based on the witnesses' statements in describing the way the attack was conducted. According to witnesses' statements, the LRA soldiers attacked first the AMUKA militia detachment, on the eastern side of the camp. When the AMUKA soldiers were overpowered, they started fleeing through the camp, running eastwards and shouting in Luo for the residents of the camp to flee because the camp was being attacked and they had been defeated. But, the LRA soldiers, some of which in AMUKA uniforms, were coming just after them in the same direction. Meanwhile, the LRA soldiers had surrounded the camp and were entering the camp from all sides. As they were also shouting in Luo languages for people to remain inside the huts, I believe that many people did not realize who was given what order and some might have thought that the order to remain inside the huts was being given by the AMUKA soldiers and not by LRA rebels.

153. Asked by the interviewers if when in paragraph 5.4, p. 4 of the preliminary report is stated: "*Then they proceeded to the main camp, which was near by, surrounded it and opened fire into it indiscriminately*", I refer to any particular target the attackers were selecting or if I meant to say "indiscriminately", I clarified that on that sentence I meant to write "indiscriminately" and made a written mistake.

Previous approaches to Barlonyo IDP camp

154. Regarding the existence of previous approaches to Barlonyo IDP camp by armed groups, all my knowledge is based on the witnesses statements that were collected during the investigation. People, including the AMUKA soldiers that were interviewed reported that one group of armed people contacted the AMUKA militia some days before the attack. According to those statements, that group was dressed in UPDF military uniforms and was speaking both Kiswahili and Luo languages (either Lango and/or Acholi). They were friendly and introduce themselves as being a UPDF force on patrol and the AMUKA soldiers believed them.

155. The police were unable to confirm from the army the identity of whom those people were. So, it was not possible to achieve any conclusion as to the identity of this armed group that approached the camp previous to the attack.

156. I also remember that some witnesses mentioned that five children had been abducted on the morning of the same day by an armed group and had been rescued by the AMUKA militia soldiers in the same day, after an engagement with the group. But, no evidence regarding the identity of this group was obtained during the investigation. Police could not conclude if that group was the same that attacked the camp on the 21st or other group.

157. There was no follow up investigation on these events previous to the attack and no additional evidence was collected regarding the identity and purposes of these groups that approach Barlonyo IDP camp previous to the attack. Additional information regarding these events can be collected from the 5th Division Commander, [REDACTED]



[REDACTED], the overall intelligence officer for all the northern Uganda, stationed in Gulu. Important could also be the information provided by [REDACTED], the UPDF Commander in charge of the AMUKA militia operating in Lira.

Identification of attackers as LRA rebels

158. The Uganda Police Investigation achieved the conclusion that LRA rebels were the responsible for Barlonyo attack, and that the key suspects included Odhiambo, Labongo and Okema, based on witnesses's statements, mainly the statements of the people that were returned LRA soldiers [REDACTED] and of a rescued person.

159. I also took into consideration the description the survivors made of the attack, because that description showed that the attack followed the pattern ("*modus operandi*") of LRA attacks: hour of attack, number of attackers, kind of uniforms worn, use of heavy weapons, targeting of the attack to civilian population, killing people indiscriminately, the destruction of civilian property, the abduction of people, the way of killing people (particularly smashing the skulls) and verbal expressions said by attackers during the attack, such as "kill all Lango".

160. Taking into consideration the evidence that was collected during the investigation by the Police, particularly the statement of the three returned LRA soldiers, only the names of Okot Odiambo, George Labongo and Okema were directly linked to the participation in the attack on Barlonyo IDP camp.

161. Finally, relevant to that conclusion was also the fact that Government soldiers never attacked civilians or burned their houses and the only known active military group operating in the North of Uganda is the LRA.

162. I am not familiar with the structure and organization of the LRA and I do not know the names of the Brigades. I have no information on what were the Brigades and Divisions of the LRA that might have participated in the attack.

163. Asked by investigators if I'm aware of any desertions among the Amuka militia approximately two weeks after the Barlonyo attack my answer is that I am not aware of any desertions among the Amuka militia.

Miscellaneous

164. Although in the "Diary of Investigations" (ERN UGA.00015.143-UGA.00015.143) is stated that it would be recorded the statement of the Vice Camp Leader Okeng Richard, I do not know if this person was ever interviewed.

165. As it is registered in the "Diary of Investigations", on 1 March 2004, at 20.00 hours, at Lubenge, along the highway from Gulu to Kampala, in Luwero District, the vehicle in which Mr. [REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED], the officer of SOCO; Mr. [REDACTED], and the driver traveled suffered an accident, when returning to Kampala after the investigation. Mr [REDACTED] died and Mr. [REDACTED] suffered serious injuries.



166. All the witnesses' statements collected during the investigation and the physical evidence collected in Barlonyo crime scene were also being transported in that vehicle.

167. The Luwero Police went to the local of the accident and collected all the objects found, including evidence and personal items. As the accident happened at night, their presence was not immediate and it might have been possible that some items were stolen or got lost after the accident. On 1 March 2004 the Luwero Police hand over all the items found to Mr. [REDACTED] who brought them back to CID HQ.

168. As far as I'm aware no important statements were missing. I admit that some (I do not know how many) statements given by some survivors might have been lost. But, those would have been statements of less importance, once from my knowledge of the investigation no statement that was decisive to the conclusions of the Police report were missing. Regarding the physical items the ones that were recovered from the accident were handed over to Ms. [REDACTED].

169. I believe the car crash was an accident and not a deliberate act committed by someone. But, there will be another file on the accident conducted by the Luwero Police.

PAGAK

Decision, planning and methodology of police investigation in Pagak and Lukodi

Investigation Reports

170. I have written the report "Preliminary report into investigations of the murders of residents of Pagak Internally Displaced Peoples Camp Lamogi Sub-County, Gulu District (Gulu CRB 337/2004)", dated 7 June 2004. A copy of this report (ERN n. UGA.00023.421-UGA.00023.425) was shown to me by the investigators of the OTP.

171. I have also written the "Preliminary Report into investigations into the murders of Lukodi Internally Displaced Peoples Camp. Bungatira Sub-County, Guly District (Gulu CRB 353/2004)", dated June 6, 2004. A copy of this report with the ERN UGA.00023.022-UGA.00023.026 was shown to me by the investigators of the OTP.

Beginning of investigation

172. The local police office in Gulu started an investigation into the crimes committed in Pagak IDP camp. They went to the crime site, conducted a preliminary investigation and communicated the findings to the CID HQ in Kampala. The document with the ERN UGA.00023.116, marked as R-1, is the telegram from the District CID officer in Gulu, to the Director CID, dated May 18, 2004, informing about killings and destruction of property in Pagak. The message was also forwarded to the Inspector General Police, the Regional Police Commander, and the Regional CID office responsible for the Northern part of Uganda.

173. The JIC Committee decided to investigate this incident, as there was a general decision to carefully investigate all atrocities committed by the LRA. In this way, CID

HQ got involved. In a letter, dated 20 May 2004, the District CID officer Gulu informed the Resident District Commissioner for Gulu District that a team of detectives from CID HQ would arrive to exhume the bodies and carry out Post Mortem. This document is marked as R3 and has the ERN UGA.00023.118.

Investigation team

174. I headed an investigation team with the total number of 20 members, including the pathologist and his assistants, the photographer, and various members of Gulu Police station. The team deployed to the crime site was smaller than in the Barlonyo investigation. I have provided the OTP with a list of all the team members, which is attached as Annex A to this statement. [REDACTED] and I were the only Police officers coming from Kampala. Besides myself, the following Gulu police investigators conducted the witness interviews both in Pagak and Lukodi: Mr. [REDACTED], Detective Assistant Superintendent Police (no. 7); Mr. [REDACTED], Detective Sergeant (no. 10); Mr. [REDACTED], Detective Corporal (no. 11); Mr. [REDACTED], Detective Corporal (no. 12); Mr. [REDACTED], Detective Captain (no. 13); and Mr. [REDACTED], Detective Captain (no. 14).

175. The "Diary of Investigations" in the Pagak police file was written by D/ASP [REDACTED] (ERN UGA.00023.113-UGA.00023.115). The "Diary of Investigations" in the Lukodi police file was written both by D/ASP [REDACTED] and D/AP [REDACTED] (ERN UGA.00023.197-UGA.00023.199). I recognize the signatures of both policemen on the documents shown to me.

Photographs and Video

176. [REDACTED] from PRO recorded the video and took the photographs during both investigations. I have identified video UGA.00023.008 as the recording made during the investigation in Pagak and Lukodi on 21, 22, 23, and 24 May 2004. Investigators have shown me a picture collection with a total of 106 photographs (ERN UGA.00023.309-UGA.00023.419).

177. Investigators have shown me a picture collection with a total of 106 photographs (ERN UGA.00023.309-UGA.00023.419). In general, these pictures show various parts of Pagak camp and Lukodi camp; the exhumation of victims; individual corpses; and injured victims in the hospitals of Gulu and Lacor. I have not been present while all of these pictures were taken, but I have no doubts that these were the pictures taken by Mr. [REDACTED] during our investigation.

Lukodi investigation

178. The mission was initially only intended to cover the Pagak incident. I left from Kampala on 21 May 2004. On the way to Gulu, I received the information that the LRA had attacked another IDP camp in Lukodi, not far away from Gulu town, the previous day. Our team decided to first go to Lukodi in order to examine this crime site and the bodies as soon after the incident as possible. The team arrived in Lukodi at 16.00hrs on 21 May 2004. The next day, we interviewed 22 witnesses and performed an exhumation the next day. When we drove to Lukodi, we saw many people along the road who fled the



camp. Some of these people can be seen in the beginning of video with the ERN UGA.00023.008. On 23 May, we moved to Pagak, where the team interviewed 29 witnesses and performed an exhumation on 24 May. That same day, we traveled back to Kampala.

Methodology

179. The investigations in Pagak and Lukodi followed the same methodology than that established in Barlonyo. This methodology is outlined in paragraph 3 of my Pagak and Lukodi reports. At the time, I had no time to write a formal investigation plan, and we simply followed the methodology that was established during the Barlonyo investigation and is described earlier in my statement.

Recording of witness statements

180. The video with the ERN UGA.00023.008 (running time around 37m 40s) shows the typical procedure of how a witness statement was taken. In the video, policeman [REDACTED] takes the statement of a relative of a victim who talks about the incident. The relatives showed us the graves and identified to us the names of the victims. In Pagak and Lukodi, I myself took witness statements.

Outline of Pagak IDP camp

181. Pagak IDP camp is located around 13 miles south west of Gulu Town. During the investigation, no sketch was prepared. The camp leader provided me with the information that the camp was populated by more than 14,000 people at the time of the attack.

182. The camp was situated along the highway Gulu-Anaka, in the vicinity of a trading center. Coming from Gulu, one first enters into Awee IDP camp, which is 2 kilometers away from Pagak and an IDP camp of even bigger size. I know that Wianono is the name of a village very close to Pagak. The UPDF detachment is located around 80 meters east of the highway. Most parts of the civilian camp, including the church and the school with the name "P-7", are located west of the highway. I have identified the church and the school on the video shown to me today (running time around 59m 14s and 59m 26s). Guruguru hills are located around 5 to 6 kilometers west of the camp. Akwa is a place around 3 kilometers away from the camp (located between the camp and Guruguru hills).

Investigation in Pagak:

183. In the course of the Pagak investigation, the team visited Pagak IDP camp, Lacor hospital in Gulu, and the UPDF 4th Division HQ. Before and after we went to Pagak, we reported our presence to the UPDF and also asked them to provide us with security escorts during the field investigation. The UPDF ran a Reception Center for rescued abducted persons, located in Gulu. This center is designated for the temporary accommodation of former abducted persons only, before they are transferred to an NGO. We visited this Reception center, where we found [REDACTED], one of the witnesses who gave a statement.



184. The "Background" section (no. 1) of my Pagak report is based on the information that I received before conducting the field investigation. The "Findings" (no. 4) section of the report is completely based on the evidence obtained during the field investigation in May, which are mainly the witness statements, but also the forensic and the physical evidence. When we arrived in Pagak camp, the camp leader told us that a total of 29 people had been killed, 17 persons had been injured, and 29 had been abducted. He indicated to me that the number of burned houses was 544.

Evidence and conclusions regarding the attack:

185. Witnesses interviewed and the information received by Gulu Police confirmed that the attack was conducted on 16 May 2004 at around 1800hrs.

186. The description of the attackers in my report is based on witness statements recorded in May 2004. Around 150 people attacked Pagak IDP camp. Some of the attackers wore green army uniforms, some of them camouflage uniforms (also referred to as madoa madoa), and some of them were dressed in civilian clothes.

187. According to the witness statements, the attackers used AK47 weapons and unspecified "big guns". Document R7 (ERN UGA.00023.127) shows that two RPG shells were recovered from the crime scene, and from that I conclude that the attackers must also have used RPG's. The shells were found by soldiers and handed over to the police. They were received by Detective Corporal [REDACTED], who is in charge of keeping records at Gulu Police. He handed them over to D/ASP [REDACTED], the Gulu Police CID officer, who handed them over to me. The shells are currently in the custody of the CID HQ in Kampala. As far as I know, the shells have not yet been analysed by Ms. [REDACTED].

188. The description of the attack is based on witness statements recorded in May 2004, especially the statements of three interviewed UPDF soldiers [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. The attackers entered the camp from the Western Side. The attack was launched on three fronts. One group of attackers went directly to the UPDF detachment, which was located on the eastern side of the main road. This group was repulsed by the UPDF detachment. Simultaneously, the two other groups came from the south western and north western side to attack the civilian part of the camp. The LRA group that was repulsed by the military detachment moved into the civilian part of the camp and joined the two other groups.

Killed victims

189. The attack continued until night time. Three people were killed inside the camp. UPDF reinforcements that arrived the next day followed the attackers and found 24 bodies in Akwa, three kilometres away from the camp. Some people were still alive and were brought to Lacor hospital. I have no knowledge if any of these victims later died in the hospital. I personally have never been to Akwa, and I base my knowledge of these events on witness statements. The dead bodies were brought back to the camp and were buried before the arrival of my team. My team exhumed 18 of these 24 bodies. We did



not have time to exhume the remaining bodies, because the security situation around Pagak did not allow us to do so and we were running out of time. A list of dead victims with the names of 18 people was compiled by the local police in Gulu (ERN UGA.00023.117), marked as document R2.

Exhumation and post-mortem

190. The exhumation followed the same procedure than in Barlonyo. After the exhumation, the bodies were reburied in the same graves. Most of the bodies were already in an advanced state of decomposition. I saw some of the bodies, but was not able to focus on the exhumed bodies, because I took witness statements at the same time. As in Barlonyo, the victims were identified with the help of relatives. I am sure that all victims were civilians. Most of them were adults, and there were also some children, but I am unable to give details regarding the exhumation. No autopsy was conducted on the remaining bodies.

191. Similar to the documentation for the exhumation in Barlonyo, document R5a with the ERN UGA.00023.124 is the formal decision from Gulu Magistrate allowing the performance of the exhumations and the post-mortem of 39 killed people. Document R6 with the ERN UGA.00023.125 is the affidavit that the Police showed to the Magistrate.

Injured victims

192. The injured victims were brought to Lacor Hospital by a Red Cross Vehicle. I was not present during that transport and have therefore no information regarding the identity of the Red Cross worker driving the vehicle. I visited Lacor Hospital and can identify myself on picture ERN UGA.00023.409 taking notes next to the bed of a victim in the hospital. A list of injured victims with the names of 13 people was compiled by the local police in Gulu (ERN UGA.00023.119-UGA.00023.120), marked as document R4. The letter "L" on the tag seen on the pictures stands for a victim from Lukodi, whereas the letter "P" stands for a victim from Pagak.

Abductions

193. Based on the witness statements recorded during the field investigation in May 2004, I concluded that 22 people were abducted during the attack. I have no knowledge if any of these people has returned since the time that I wrote my report. This information should have been recorded with the local police office in Gulu.

Destruction of property

194. Initially, the camp leader had indicated to us that the number of destroyed houses in the camp was 544. [REDACTED], member of the JIC team, made another count, which resulted in the number of around 350 destroyed houses. Houses were not burnt all over the camp. They were dispersed mostly in the northwestern part of the camp, which is the area from where the attackers left the camp.

Question of LRA collaborators inside the camp

UGA.00038.034


195. [REDACTED] a resident of the camp, was one of the witnesses interviewed during our investigation. He had said that he saw some suspicious people before the attack and had mentioned this fact to other camp residents. Later on, he was suspected to have collaborated with the LRA. The UPDF arrested him and put him in military detention. [REDACTED] denied any involvement, and as far as I could see at the time, there was no evidence for his collaboration. We were also not able to determine any other information regarding collaboration from inside the camp.

Previous attacks to Pagak IDP camp

196. I am aware that Pagak IDP camp had previously been attacked by LRA members. As far as I know, nobody was killed during these attacks. The police did not investigate any of these attacks. The camp leader is the best person to speak to about these earlier incidents.

Identification of attackers as LRA rebels

197. I have the following reasons to identify the people who attacked Pagak IDP camp as members of the LRA:

198. The whole *modus operandi* was typical for an LRA attack. The attackers were many, they used heavy weapons, they were randomly shooting civilians, and they hit the victims with clubs in the back of their head.

199. Pagak is the home area of Captain Charles Abola who had defected from the LRA a few weeks prior to the attack. He went back to the camp, and I assume that local media reported the story, praising what Abola did and supporting him. Some of the interviewed witnesses heard the attackers make a reference to the fact that Pagak was attacked as a revenge for Abola being a "traitor".

200. Pagak is also the home area of Vincent Otti. In his statement, the camp leader reported that Otti phoned him in Gulu town while the attack was going on. Otti told him that his house was set on fire. Another witness testified that she personally saw Otti after she had been abducted and brought to Guruguru hills. Finally, the UPDF has verbally informed me about the existence of intercepted conversations, which link Otti to the Pagak attack.

LUKODI

Outline of Lukodi IDP camp:

201. Lukodi IDP camp is located around 10 miles north of Gulu Town along the main road. During the investigation, no sketch was prepared. The bulk of the camp is south of the military detachment. The camp leader provided me with information that the camp was populated by around 7,000 people at the time of the attack.

202. Both the military detachment and the major part of the civilian camp are located east of the highway. A school is also located around 80 meters east of the main road. A trading center is placed just west of the road. The huts shown on video, running time 8m

UGA.00036.035



26s, are close to the school. The military detachment was commanded by a UPDF commander, but consisted mainly of members of the Local Defense Unit. The camp is not officially recognized as an IDP camp.

203. When we went to Lukodi, we saw many people on the road running in the opposite direction, fleeing the crime site. When we arrived at the camp, the camp was completely empty.

Investigation in Lukodi:

204. In the course of the investigation, we visited Lukodi IDP camp, Gulu Main hospital, and the UPDF 4th Divisional HQ. As for Pagak, the "Background" section (no. 1) of my report was based on information received before the field investigation. The "Findings" section (no. 4) is completely based on evidence obtained during the field investigation in May, which are mainly the witness statements, but also the forensic and physical evidence.

Evidence and conclusions regarding the attack:

205. The witnesses interviewed and the information received by Gulu Police confirmed that the attack was conducted on 20 May 2004 at around 1800hrs.

206. The description of the attackers is based on witness statements recorded in May 2004. Around 80 people attacked Pagak IDP camp. Some of the attackers wore deep green army uniforms similar to those worn by the UPDF. The attackers had tied their shirts around their waists and were bare-chested. In this way, they could not have been mistaken for UPDF soldiers by the camp residents.

207. The UPDF commander testified that the LRA used heavy and small arms to attack the detachment. Document R5 (ERN UGA.00023.204) lists 207 cartridges, nine bullets, one burnt magazine, and a part of an RPG shells, all recovered from the camp site. The video (running time around 19m 05s) shows how some of the items were collected at the camp site. I was present when these shells were collected. The video also shows part of an RPG shell and an empty magazine (running time 22m 30s). These items were received by Detective Captain [REDACTED]. He handed them over to D/ASP [REDACTED], who handed them over to me. The listed items are currently in the custody of the CID HQ in Kampala.

208. The description of the attack is based on witness statements recorded in May 2004.

209. The attackers entered the camp from the Northern and North Eastern direction. Civilians were forced to flee westwards and came in between the attackers and the army detachment. By doing so, the army was not able to return the fire without risking killing civilians. The UPDF commander decided to withdraw. The LRA entered the military part of the camp and destroyed it completely. Afterwards, they moved to the civilian part of the camp, where they also set houses on fire. Some people were killed outside their huts. Some residents took refuge in the trading center and in the school. The people who were trapped inside heard the attackers speak Acholi and Lango. The UPDF came back the same night with reinforcements, because the nearest UPDF detachment is only five kilometers away.



Killed victims:

210. When we arrived, the camp leader informed us that 42 civilians were killed while 16 were admitted into Gulu Hospital. No Government soldier was killed. The killed victims were camp residents who did not manage to flee in time when the LRA moved into the civilian parts of the camp. Some people were buried outside of the camp, but we decided it was too much of a security risk to go there.

Exhumation and post-mortem:

211. An exhumation was performed only on 25 bodies, because not all the victims were buried at the camp site. The exhumation followed the same procedure than in Barlonyo and Pagak. Each body was buried separately. After the exhumation, the bodies were re-buried in the same individual graves. I identify the pathologist (in green dress) and some volunteers on picture ERN UGA.00023.382. I saw some of the bodies, but did not focus too much on the exhumed bodies, because I took witness statements at the same time. I am sure that all victims were civilians. Most of them were adults, and there were also some children, but I am unable to give details regarding the exhumation. The police officer attached to the pathologist is [REDACTED]. He has more information on this topic. On the picture with the ERN UGA.00023.312, I recognize one of the graves in Lukodi, covered with bricks. I recognize another grave on picture ERN UGA.00023.319, which had the bodies of young children inside. I do not know why the leaves are placed next to the grave. After the exhumation, the bodies were reburied in the same graves. As in Pagak, we decided that it was too risky to see the places outside of the camp where the other victims were buried. The camp leader knows where the other burial places are.

212. Document R2 with the ERN UGA.00023.201 is the formal decision from Gulu Magistrate allowing the performance of the exhumations and the post-mortem of 25 killed people. Document R1 with the ERN UGA.00023.200 is the affidavit that the Police showed to the Magistrate.

Injured victims

213. I visited Gulu Main Hospital together with the pathologist. Pictures ERN UGA.0023.386 and ERN UGA.00023.388 show when we arrived at the hospital. The picture with the ERN UGA.00023.406 shows me in the hospital in between the Medical Superintendent of the hospital, Dr. Kaducu, and the pathologist. I have recognized the injured victims of Lukodi attack on the pictures with following ERN numbers: ERN UGA.0023.389-UGA.00023.406.

Destruction of property

214. The camp leader and the police team agreed that the number of destroyed huts in the civilian part was 210, whereas 36 huts were destroyed in the military detachment. Most houses were destroyed in the area next to the school. The video (running time 12m 56s) shows that some of the huts were still smoldering at the time we were conducting our investigation. I remember having seen the two burnt bicycles inside the destroyed hut on picture ERN UGA.00023.350.

UGA.00038.037



Identification of attackers as LRA rebels

215. The whole modus operandi was typical for an LRA attack. In addition, some residents were trapped inside the trading center and heard the attackers saying that they would kill them all. They were speaking in a mixture of Acholi and Lango languages. A witness interviewed during our investigation was able to identify the attackers as LRA and provided us with names of some of their commanders.

Follow-up on Pagak and Lukodi

216. The investigations related to Pagak and Lukodi are still ongoing, but no additional evidence has been collected since early June of this year. The conclusions of my reports are based exclusively on the evidence included in the two police files. The witness statements included in these files are, at present time, the main source of evidence held in the hands of the Ugandan Police. I recognize the witness statements shown to me during the interview as the ones taken by my investigative team in May 2004. The 23 witness statements related to Lukodi have the ERN UGA.00023.133 to UGA.00023.187. The 29 witness statements related to Pagak have the ERN UGA.0023.033 to UGA.00023.103.

LWALA FILE:

217. Following the general decision, taken in June 2004, of investigate all the atrocities committed by the LRA, I talked to the regional CID officer for the Mid Eastern Region, based in Soroti, and told him to ensure that the investigations on the Lwala attack should be done. Some three or four weeks ago I insisted on the reinforcement of those investigations.

218. I have no active participation on the on-going investigations, but I'm supervising and coordinating the whole proceedings regarding all the reopened investigations.

219. From my knowledge of the file, the statement of the head priest of the school was taken in January 2004 and the other statements were taken in September 2004 after the investigations restarted. Since then some victims' identifications were obtained and the statements of 13 people were collected. Those statements were taken by the local police in Kaberamaido.

220. There's no Police investigation report made still. The investigation is still ongoing. During the present interview I delivered to OTP investigators a copy of the Police file CBR 31/2000, from Kaberamaido Police Station, regarding Lwala incident, now identified by ERN UGA.00024.014-UGA.00024.107, in which can be found several witnesses statements and other documents.

221. The sketch plan of Lwala School and surroundings (ERN n. UGA.000 UGA.00024.100) was made by [REDACTED] (Police officer in Kaberamaido - District CID).

222. The diary of investigations (ERN UGA.00024.101-UGA.00024.107) included in the file also came from Kaberamaido local Police.



223. Until now, Police was not able to trace some of the girls that were abducted, even those that were able to escape.

224. To my knowledge, so far they have no suspects on the individual perpetrators. On the statements people say it was LRA.

Closing Procedure:

225. I have nothing to add to the above statement nor do I have anything to clarify.

226. I have given the answers to the questions of my own free will

227. There has been no threat, promise or inducement which has influenced my answers.

228. I have no complaints about the way I was treated during this interview.

229. I am agreeable to a copy of my statement being transmitted to the law enforcement of a State if requested by a State.

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

1. This Statement has been read over to me in the English language and is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this Statement voluntarily and I am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Court and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the International Criminal Court.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Dated: 30th NOV 2004

